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RATIONALISM IN REGULATION
ChristopherC. DeMuth*
Douglas H. Ginsburg**
RETAKING RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER
PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH. By Richard L. Revesz &

Michael A. Livermore. New York: Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. viii,
254. $34.95
INTRODUCTION

Retaking Rationality: How Cost-BenefitAnalysis Can Better Protect the
Environment and Our Health, by Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore, aims to convince those who favor more government regulation-in
particular environmental groups-that they should embrace cost-benefit
analysis and turn it to their purposes. Coauthored by a prominent law school
dean and a recent student with a background in environmental advocacy,'
the book is a jarring combination of roundhouse political polemics and careful academic argument. Sweeping pronouncements are followed -by
qualifications that leave the sweep of the pronouncements in doubt-rather
like the give-and-take of the law school classroom where the work may have
originated. The result cannot be judged a success either as polemic or scholarship, but the effort is highly instructive--often unintentionally-regarding
the uses, limitations, and politics of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory policymaking. 2
The argument of Retaking Rationality is that cost-benefit analysis is a
valuable tool for calibrating health, safety, and environmental regulation and
making bureaucratic decisionmaking more transparent and accountable, but
has been perverted into a tool for weakening regulation, thereby degrading
the environment and endangering public health and safety. 3 In the book's
D.C. Searle Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1. Revesz is faculty director and Livermore is executive director of the New York University
School of Law's Institute for Policy Integrity, which they founded to advocate the teachings of Retaking Rationality. The Institute's website is http://www.policyintegrity.org.
**

2. The authors of this Review were administrators of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") in the United States Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), which
oversees agency regulations under statutory and Executive Order authorities, during the Reagan
Administration when an explicit cost-benefit standard was first being applied (DeMuth in 1981-84
and Ginsburg in 1984-85). We later wrote an article explaining and defending the OIRA review
process, Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1075 (1986). Our tenures and our article both come in for criticism in
Retaking Rationality. Pp. 23-29, 165-68.
3.
In the authors' words, cost-benefit analysis is "necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make," p. 3, but "[blecause current cost-benefit analysis is biased against
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account, Republican administrations-those of Ronald Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush-are "conservative" and "antiregulation"
and use cost-benefit analysis to block regulatory protections at the behest of
corporate interests, while Democratic administrations-those of Bill Clinton
and, the authors adumbrate, Barack Obama-are "progressive" and
"proregulation" and use cost-benefit analysis in a "neutral" fashion to improve the substance of policy.4 The problem is that the conservatives and
business interests have been so adept at twisting cost-benefit analysis into an
antiregulation weapon that environmental, consumer, and labor organizations have come to oppose the very idea of assessing regulatory benefits and
costs. As a result, when progressives are in office and in a position to set
things straight, proregulation groups continue to sit out the cost-benefit debates. Their boycott is shortsighted for two reasons. First, cost-benefit
analysis is here to stay, entrenched in many statutes and judicial precedents.
Second, when purged of the analytical "fallacies" introduced by conservatives, cost-benefit analysis is a powerful tool for more aggressive
regulation-properly understood, it is proregulation not antiregulation. "Retaking rationality" means ending the boycott and restoring the neutral,
beneficial principles that have been hijacked:
This is the responsibility of proregulatory interests groups [sic], as well as
citizens and voters participating in democratic politics. By holding our
leaders to a restored vision of cost-benefit analysis, we can make up for the
damage that has been done to the technique, and allow it to serve a useful
role in improving regulatory decisionmaking-and therefore our environment, our public health, and our economic prosperity. (p. 51)

Within this stark narrative structure, the intellectual heart of the book is
a debunking of "Eight Fallacies of Cost-Benefit Analysis" perpetrated by
antiregulation conservatives and a demonstration of how correct analysis
will lead to stricter government controls. A final section criticizes the procedure conservatives have used to block worthwhile regulations with their
fallacious theories---central review of agency rulemaking by the Office of
regulation, efficient and worthwhile regulations do not pass the test.... The result? Less safety,
worse health, and a dirtier environment." P. It. The argument recurs throughout the book and is
presented in stronger terms in the book's publicity release. See infra note 21.
4. Party affiliations are never mentioned, but the pattern is obvious. President Ronald Reagan's cost-benefit Executive Order and OMB review process "led to fears that industries would be
able to kill regulations contrary to their interests under cover of night," and "[tihese fears were
largely vindicated," p. 27; President George H. W. Bush's White House Council on Competitiveness
"was sharply critical of any regulation and deeply solicitous of business interests:' p. 30; when
President Bill Clinton established a new Executive Order and modified the OMB review process,
"[t]he message from the Clinton White House was that centralized review and cost-benefit analysis
could serve as a neutral tool," p. 32; but then the dark times retumed-"[u]nder President George W.
Bush, the link between the deregulatory agenda and cost-benefit analysis has become nearly complete." P. 42. The contrasts are elaborated throughout the book. Retaking Rationality was published
in 2008, before the presidential election of that year, but the authors anticipate the return of rationality: "With a new administration entering office in January 2009, [progressive proregulation] groups
may again have an opportunity to participate," p. 12. And there is hope that these groups might do
so-"[H]ope is always at a zenith during a presidential election cycle, especially if no incumbent is
running. It is during these imes that many things seem possible, and the transformative power of
democratic politics is at its maximum." P. 193.
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Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") within the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB")-and suggests how OIRA review could be
made more regulation friendly.
This Review follows the structure of Retaking Rationality. In Part I we
criticize the book's narrative (summarized above) as cartoonish and unhistorical-we think it is confusing rather than helpful to understanding recent
developments and controversies in cost-benefit analysis and the organization
of regulatory decisionmaking within the executive branch. In Part II we consider the book's "Eight Fallacies of Cost-Benefit Analysis." We find that
these discussions are generally well informed and interesting but suffer from
the effort to squeeze cost-benefit issues into the antiregulation-versusproregulation narrative; moreover the discussions are often excessively abstract and ambitious concerning the function of cost-benefit analysis, and
they entirely fail to support the thesis that cost-benefit fallacies have been
used to defeat beneficial regulations. Finally, in Part III we discuss the authors' arguments about the need for and practice of OMB/OIRA oversight of
agency rulemaking. Here we criticize as na've the book's argument that
there is no need for an institutional counterweight to agency parochialism
and that OIRA's role should be recast as one of coordination, calibration,
and promotion of a proregulatory agenda against the forces of agency sloth.
A concluding Part sums up our arguments.

I.

THE NARRATIVE

There are two serious problems with the Retaking Rationality narrative.
The first is that it portrays regulatory policymaking as much more partisan
than it is. Although government regulation is sometimes the subject of partisan contention during election seasons,' in practice it is largely the domain
of interest-group politics and interbranch rivalry between the president and
Congress rather than of deep partisan or philosophical divides.
Among academics, there is much less disagreement between liberals and
conservatives over regulatory policy than over taxation, entitlement, and
health-care and insurance policy. Across the spectrum, academic students of
regulation tend to favor deregulation when it comes to price and entry controls in competitive markets (the sorts of things the Civil Aeronautics Board
used to do before its abolition at the hands of Edward Kennedy, Stephen
Breyer, and Alfred Kahn), and "regulatory reform" when it comes to environmental, health, and safety regulation. 6 "Regulatory reform" means, inter
5. As in candidate Barack Obama's charge, during the 2008 presidential campaign, that the
unfolding financial crisis was the result of "Bush deregulation"; but even that turned out not to be
particularly partisan, because his opponent, John McCain, seemed to agree with him. See Adam
Nagourney, Economic Woes Set Tone for Rivals in 2nd Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at Al
(noting that while Obama placed blame for the crisis squarely on the Bush Administration, McCain
left these charges unanswered and characterized his own senatorial record as being "sometimes at
odds" with Bush).
6. Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Antonin Scalia, whose differences on many jurisprudential issues are well known, provide a good example of the liberal-conservative congruence on
regulatory policy. Justice Breyer played an instrumental role in the abolition of the Civil Aeronautics
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alia,
preferring market-incentive over command-and-control techniques, regulating outputs rather than inputs, and using cost-benefit analysis to set
regulatory standards and priorities; many distinguished academic liberals as
well as conservatives have contributed to this literature, as Revesz and Livermore acknowledge at various points. The purpose of these reforms is to
make regulation more effective and productive-to counter the influence of
narrow interest groups in bending rules to their selfish advantage, to avoid
policies that are wasteful or counterproductive, and to get more environmental bang for the policy buck. There are important differences among
academics concerning health and safety standards in competitive marketssuch as pharmaceutical, automobile safety, and workplace health and safety
controls-where conservatives tend to see redundancy with market incentives and harmful "unintended consequences" and liberals tend to see
needed adjustments and backstops to the marketplace.8 But the primary focus of Retaking Rationality is environmental regulation, where the
government is providing public goods for which there is little effective marBoard and wrote approvingly of the results. Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the
Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1005, 1010-11 (1987) (arguing that as a result of
airline deregulation, "[c]ompetition has forced a better match between supply and demand, leading
to greater efficiency and increased satisfaction of consumer preferences"); see also Richard B.
Stewart, Tribute to Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 19, 21 (2008) (discussing the leadership of Senator Kennedy, Justice Breyer, and Professor Kahn in airline deregulation).
He has also been a proponent of reforming health, safety, and environmental regulation. See
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993);
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 131-55, 261-84 (1982). Justice Scalia was general counsel of the United States Office of Telecommunications Policy (which promoted
telecommunications deregulation) from 1972 to 1974, and from 1977 to 1981 was coeditor-in-chief
(along with Murray Weidenbaum, described by Revesz and Livermore as a particularly zealous
deregulator) of the American Enterprise Institute's magazine, REGULATION, which consistently
advocated abolition of economic regulation in competitive markets and improvement-throughreform of health, safety, and environmental regulation. See Archive of REGULATION issues,
www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
regulmpast issues.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). For additional examples, see the archives of
the American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Institution Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (19962007), http://www.reg-markets.org/publications/index.phpmenuid=3, featuring hundreds of papers
on economic deregulation and health-safety-environmental regulatory reform by scholars from
across the philosophical spectrum.
7.

A prominent exception to the academic consensus on regulatory reform is FRANK AC-

KERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE

VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). Although Ackerman and Heinzerling, like Revesz and Livermore, in-

veigh against particular techniques of cost-benefit analysis, their essential position is rejectionist:
they do not want to regulate within resource constraints but rather to fight for more resources for the
things they favor. For responses to PRICELESS, see ROBERT W. HAHN, IN DEFENSE OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 15, 2004, at 27 (book review), available at http://www.tnr.conarticle/books-andarts/your-money-or-your-life.
Cf Christopher DeMuth, Regulatory Policy in the Reagan Administration, in AMERICAN
("[i]t is an interesting
puzzle that economists have been much more successful in persuading others of the evils of price
fixing than of the evils of quality fixing [product standardization]"). Compare SAM PELTZMAN,
REGULATION AND THE NATURAL PROGRESS OF OPULENCE (2005), available at http:Ilwww.
aei.org/book/821?action=add&id=821, with RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
8.

ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980s 504, 508-10 (Martin Feldstein ed.) (1994)
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ket demand and where there is little academic disagreement about the need
for regulation.9
Among practicing politicians, Republicans are no doubt more attentive
to business interests, more sympathetic to private markets, and more skeptical about the need for regulation, while Democrats are more attentive to

labor interests, more skeptical about private markets, and more sympathetic
to regulation. But in environmental and health regulation, the record across
administrations is much more one of continuity than of the lurches that characterize tax and health-care policy; and disagreements between the White
House (not only OMB/OIRA but also the Council of Economic Advisors

("CEA")) and the regulatory agencies have been a bipartisan phenomenon.
Revesz and Livermore emphasize what they regard as Republican misdeeds
and Democratic good deeds, but they could have told a different story. Rich-

ard Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") by
Executive Order, banned DDT, and proposed a national tax on sulfur diox-

ide emissions ignored by a Democratic Congress.'0 Jimmy Carter launched
the Regulatory Analysis Review Group ("RARG")-the White House precursor to OIRA-which tangled with the EPA, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA"), and other agencies over new regulations,
and signed the legislation creating OIRA (the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1980"-brainchild of Democratic Senators Lawton Chiles and Lloyd Bentsen) over the vehement opposition of his cabinet officers." Ronald Reagan
was the most "antiregulation" of recent presidents-and his EPA (during the
tenures of William Ruckelshaus and Lee Thomas, following the Anne Gorsuch Superfund scandal) tightened the gasoline lead-phasedown and many3
other EPA rules and was notably aggressive in environmental enforcement.
George H.W. Bush championed and won many improvements to the Clean
Air Act, including the sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade program that Revesz and

9. Price and entry controls are not covered in the book, although the authors occasionally
confuse the distinction between deregulation and regulatory reform by using the term "economic
regulation" when they seem to mean environmental regulation. Pp. 9, 10.
10.

See R.

SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR

ACT 149-51 (1983).

Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 350111.
3521 (2006)).
12. See Christopher C. DeMuth, ConstrainingRegulatory Costs-Part I: The White House
Review Programs,REG., Jan./Feb. 1980, at 13, 18-20; Richard M. Neustadt, Taming the Paperwork
Tiger: An Experiment in Regulatory Management, REG., Jan./Feb. 1981, at 28, 32; Janet A. Weiss,
The powers of problem definition: The case of government paperwork, 22 POL'Y ScI. 97, 106-07
(1989).
13. Revesz and Livermore say that "[e]ven Ronald Reagan did not stop the phaseout of
leaded gasoline." P. 18. In fact, the Reagan Administration significantly tightened the lead phasedown rules, with the wholehearted support of OIRA and one of the authors of this review, and added
a marketable-permits policy that further accelerated the removal of lead from the U.S. gasoline
supply. See DeMuth, supra note 8, at 508; Richard G. Newell & Kristian Rogers, The Market-Based
Lead Phasedown, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM
TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 171, 171-78 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007). On
the enforcement point, see Philip Shabecoff, E•P.A. Record Set in Pollution Cases, N.Y TIMES, Dec.
9, 1988, at A24.
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Livermore heartily approve. 4 Bill Clinton was the most "proregulation" of
recent presidents-and his OIRA and CEA inveighed forcefully (although
with only modest effect) against many EPA actions, notably the Agency's
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone and particulates, which
they regarded as excessively strict and costly, and the EPA's official reports
on the benefits and costs of air pollution rules. 5 George W. Bush championed and won stringent new energy conservation standards including the
phased abolition of the incandescent light bulb,16 and his EPA issued new or
tighter standards for lead, mercury, diesel engine exhaust, and other pollutants. 7 OI RA administrators of both parties, ourselves included, can tell war
stories of standing bravely for right policy in the face of strenuous opposition from powerful administration constituencies. More generally, aggregate
health, safety, and environmental regulatory activity-according to such
rough measures as agency budgets, agency enforcement budgets, numbers
of new regulations, and estimated costs and benefits of new regulationshas not differed much from administration to administration.' 8 Nor, evi14. Revesz and Livermore's discussion at pp. 136-37 of the sulfur dioxide trading program
offers no credit to Bush. On the provenance of the program, see John M. Broder, Froma Theory to a
Consensus on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at Al.
15. See, e.g., Randall Lutter & Richard B. Belzer, EPA Pats Itself on the Back, REG., Fall
2000, at 23, 27; John H. Cushman, Jr., E.RA. Advocating Higher Standards to Clean the Air, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at Al; John H. Cushman, Jr., Top E.P.A Official Not Backing Down on Air
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997, at Al.
16. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492,
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong-publiclaws&
docid=f:publl40.1l0.pdf; Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Twenty in Ten: Strengthening Energy Security and Addressing Climate Change (May 14, 2007), available at http:l/
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 2007/05/20070514-2.html.
17. See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel; Final
Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 38957 (June 29, 2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 69, 80, 86, 89, 94, 1039,
1048, 1051, 1065, 1068); Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units; Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 28605 (May 18, 2005) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for Lead and Copper: ShortTerm Regulatory Revisions and Clarifications; Final Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 57781 (Oct. 10, 2007). John
Graham, administrator of OIRA for President Bush from 2001 through 2006, provides an illuminating account of regulatory policymaking in the Bush administration in JOHN D. GRAHAM, BUSH ON
THE HOME FRONT: DOMESTIC POLICY TRIUMPHS AND SETBACKS chs. 7, 8, and 10 (forthcoming
2010). The EPA mercury rule was less stringent than a Clinton Administration "midnight regulation"
would have been and was opposed by environmental groups (it was also, like many George W. Bush
Administration rules discussed in this Review, a legal botch-vacated in New Jersey v. EPA, 517
F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). But, as Graham explains, the controversy was dominated by regional
conflicts, not partisan conflicts. See GRAHAM, supra at 210-14.
18. The one discernable pattern is that, within administrations of both parties, rulemaking,
and especially the issuance of very costly new rules, tends to increase as the administration ages and
crescendos in its final year. See U.S. Office of Mgmt. and Budget, 2008 Report to Congress on the
Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal
Entities 45-47 figs.2-1 & 2-2 (2008), available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/information_
and-regulatory-affairs/2008 cb -final.pdf; cf Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Competitive Enterprise Inst.,
Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State (2009), available at http://cei.org/cei-files/fm/active/O/Wayne%2OCrews%20-%2010,000%2OCommandments%
202009.pdf; Veronique de Rugy & Melinda Warren, Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ. &
Murray Weidenbaum Ctr. on the Econ., Gov't, and Pub. Pol'y at Washington Univ. in St. Louis,
Expansion of Regulatory Budgets and Staffing Continues in the New Administration: An
Analysis of the U.S. Budget for Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 (2009), available at
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dently, was the vigor or effectiveness of OIRA review much different in the
Clinton and W. Bush Administrations.' 9
Selective anecdotalism is a weakness of debate over regulatory policy-

an inescapable weakness because regulation operates by piecework (rulemaking involving widely varying issues and circumstances) and resists
aggregation and generalization. The growing use and sophistication of
regulatory cost-benefit analysis since 1980 has improved our ability to characterize policy trends, but the analyses have themselves varied widely in

quality and methodology.20 The important point is that environmental protection is a consensus issue in American politics, something that virtually all

political leaders subscribe to and would ignore at their peril. That consensus
has produced hundreds of billions of dollars of public investment and

tremendous improvements in environmental quality from one administration
to the next over a period of forty years.2 The serious policy disagreements

concern means not ends, and debates over means have been robust within
the administrations of both parties.
The second problem is that "antiregulation" versus "proregulation"-a
formulation employed throughout both the narrative and analytical sections
of Retaking Rationality-is an impossibly crude way to characterize differences over regulatory policy or cost-benefit analysis. Regulation is a form of
government action, with advantages and disadvantages from case to case

relative to other forms of action or no action at all: there is no principled,
coherent sense in which one can be "for" or "against" regulation tout court.
To adopt this dichotomy is to leave the world of the analyst and enter the
http://regbudget.mercatus.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Regulators-Budget-Report-Final-VersionOctober-29.pdf; Robert W. Hahn, AEI Ctr. for Reg. & Mar. Stud., An Analysis of the 2008 Government Report on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (2008), available at http://regmarkets.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpnZ.pdf.
19. See the articles by John D. Graham and Paul R. Roe, Cary Coglianese, Jerry L. Mashaw,
and Roger G. Noll in Symposium, Reflections on Executive Order 13,422, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 77
(2008), and Stuart Shapiro, Presidentsand Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under
the Clinton and Bush (43)Administrations,23 J.L. & POL. 393, 417 (2007) ("One trend is consistent
through the various data: despite profound differences in ideology and widespread perceptions of
difference in the substance of their regulatory efforts, the regulatory process looks very similar
between the Bush and Clinton Administrations.").

20.

See

HAHN,

supra note 18.

21. We note with dismay that Oxford University Press's publicity release for Retaking Rationality proclaims:
That America's natural environment has been degraded and despoiled over the past 25 years is
beyond dispute. Nor has there been any shortage of reasons why-short-sighted politicians ...
and the dramatic weakening of environmental regulations. In Retaking Rationality, Richard
Revesz and Michael Livermore argue convincingly that one of the least understood-and most
important-causes of our failure to protect the environment has been a misguided rejection of
reason.
Oxford University Press, Description of Retaking Rationality, www.oup.com/us/catalog/generalU
3 8 7
subject/Law/EnvironmentalLaw/?view=usa&ci=9780195 6 5 4 (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). In
fact, environmental quality has been improving throughout the period since the establishment of the
EPA and the first modem pollution control statutes in the early 1970s. See, e.g., JOEL M. SCHWARTZ
& STEVEN E HAYWARD, AIR QUALITY IN AMERICA (2007); PACIFIC RESEARCH INST., INDEX OF
LEADING ENVIRONMENTAL

INDICATORS

(1996-2009), available at http://environment.pacific

research.org/index-of-leading-environmental-indicators
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world of the lobbyist. Especially in environmental regulation, where regulated firms are paying (in the first instance) the costs of pure or nearly pure
public goods, firms will characteristically favor the most lenient plausible
standards while environmental groups will characteristically favor the most
stringent plausible standards. Both sides realize they are in something like a
zero-sum lobbying game and adopt positions based on expectations of opposing positions-they will indeed be "pro" and "anti" in the particular
case, whatever concessions they make for tactical reasons. 22 But a book written by academics and published by a prestigious university press is not,
presumably, a how-to-succeed manual for lobbyists-that would be appropriate for a group such as the Natural Resources Defense Council. Revesz
and Livermore have set themselves to persuading environmental activists
that cost-benefit analysis can advance their cause; in characterizing groups,
public officials, and schools of thought as antiregulation or proregulation,
they may have decided to adopt the Manichaean ethos of their primary audience at the expense of clarity and accuracy. But when they come to
discussing issues of cost-benefit method and philosophy in the same terms,
they have entered intellectually treacherous territory.
Fortunately, as the cost-benefit discussions proceed, the authors reveal
themselves to be members in good standing of the liberal wing of the academic regulatory reform movement: ultimately, they are for right policy, not
lobbying scalps. Their antiregulation cost-benefit "fallacies" are not complete shams but have some basis in reason and disinterested analysis. Their
proregulation correctives are subject to qualifications and caveats, some of
them quite substantial. They allow that antiregulation conservatives have
occasionally introduced reforms-such as marketable permits, which allow
firms to calibrate their pollution abatement efforts according to differential
abatement costs-that have spurred environmental progress. And, in the
end, even the unsullied, proregulation cost-benefit analysis they favor will
counsel priority setting and something short of zero pollution in each and
every case.
We hope the authors do not lose their audience when the going gets nuanced. But the difficulties run deeper than thematic dissonance.
II. THE COST-BENEFIT FALLACIES
Retaking Rationality's "Eight Fallacies of Cost-Benefit Analysis" are
summarized in the book's chapter titles as follows: All Unintended Consequences are Bad, Wealth Equals Health, Older People are Less Valuable,
People Cannot Adapt, People Always Want to Put Off Bad Things, We are
Worth More than Our Children, People Value Only What They Use, and
Industry Cannot Adapt. At the book's outset, we are told that the antiregulation monopoly on cost-benefit issues "has had profound negative
22. Our characterization is itself overbroad: industry groups are typically much less united
than environmental groups, because firms may favor stricter regulation in order to gain private competitive advantages. See Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, REG., Fall
1996, at 26; Kimberly A. Strassel, Op-Ed., Rent-Seekers Inc., WALL ST.J., Oct. 2, 2009, at A17.
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consequences.,23 Later we are told that the eight fallacies "together ...
amount to a virtual Berlin Wall blocking good regulations" (p. 145). But the
chapters themselves tell a vividly different story. The titles are fallacies alright but nobody actually believes any of them-they are the authors' own
waggish slogans, written with chapter-title license. The actual propositions
turn out not to be fallacies at all but rather questions of method, measurement, and philosophy on which, the authors acknowledge, reasonable
people can disagree. Can and do: each one is the subject of robust debate in
academic journals and government councils. Those debates (certainly the
academic ones) are generally aimed at producing better regulation rather
than merely more or less regulation, and feature many positions that are either intermediate or indeterminate on the score of regulatory volume and
stringency. Most strikingly, the authors' proregulation positions have been
doing at least as well as their antiregulation positions in government rulemaking. The evidence that beneficial rules have been throttled by the forces
of antiregulation bias is essentially nil.
Revesz and Livermore's accounts of the cost-benefit debates are well informed and instructive. Although the authors are not above selective
anecdotalism, for the most part they balance forceful presentations of their
own positions with fair presentations of contrary positions. But what we
found most instructive were two features of their approach that we regard as
serious deficiencies. First, they consider questions of method and philosophy at too high a level of abstraction-arguing that certain positions are
definitively correct or incorrect when instead they are more or less useful in
different circumstances. Second, they regard regulatory cost-benefit analysis
as a device for social engineering. The social-engineering approach treats
people and institutions as relatively passive and regulation dependent-as
cogs in a machinery of government optimization and control-and wants
cost-benefit analysis to subsume many important political questions. Our
view of cost-benefit analysis is much more modest. We regard it as a device
for gauging public interventions in a world that is governed mainly by the
decisions of individuals and markets, and where the political process generates profuse demands for intervention that vary greatly in their merits and
cannot all be accommodated in any event. The Revesz-Livermore approach
is certainly proregulation, but to our way of thinking it is mainly unrealistic.
We think there are natural limits to the possibilities of effective government
intervention-especially in a nation as individualistic and heterogeneous as
the United States-which cannot be reduced much by techniques of analysis
and control. And we think that many important political questions-such as
the just distribution of wealth, the desirability of government paternalism,
and the obligations of current generations to future generations--cannot be
effectively decided by cost-benefit analysis. 24
23.

E.4.Seealsop.51.

24. Retaking Rationality begins and ends with thoughtful admonitions that cost-benefit
analysis is not "a master decisionmaking procedure," p. 15, or a "panacea" and "must also be augmented with discussions of our values, political debate, and analysis of non-cost-benefit factors,"
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The problems of excessive abstraction and excessive ambition are related: both derive from the conviction that pure reason-the "rationality" of
the book's title-is capable of resolving or displacing a great many political
and intellectual differences." This impulse may, ironically, lead one to chalk
up opposing views to bad motives rather than legitimate disagreement, as
sometimes happens in Retaking Rationality. Looking at cost-benefit issues
in the context of specific cases rather than pure principle tends to suggest
practical answers to questions of method, and also to suggest practical limitations to cost-benefit analysis itself. As an added benefit, the narrower,
more pragmatic approach tends to eliminate the clutter of partisan polemics
and the effort to judge cost-benefit methods according to their tendency to
produce more regulation rather than more social welfare.
These arguments are developed in the following brief reviews of Retaking Rationality's cost-benefit arguments. We begin with more extended
discussions of the books first three fallacies; then, with the themes of our
criticisms established, we extend them more briefly to the last five fallacies.
A. All Unintended Consequencesare Bad

Regulations that reduce health and safety risks may produce offsetting
increases in risks. When regulations ban or restrict certain risky products or
activities, or increase their prices or costs or reduce their utility, people may
substitute other products or activities that involve risks of their own. Thus,
banning an effective pharmaceutical drug because of its harmful side effects
may lead people to substitute drugs that are less effective or have their own
harmful side effects. The authors do not object to taking account of such
"risk tradeoffs" in assessing the costs and benefits of regulations-indeed
they applaud it so long as the causal link is not excessively attenuated. But
they think that proponents of risk-tradeoff analysis "tend to look only at
negative collateral consequences" and to ignore collateral benefits (p. 55).
Their principal example of collateral benefits is controls on conventional air
pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate matterthey are imposed to provide immediate health and aesthetic benefits but
have the additional benefit of reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gasses, thereby reducing the risks of global warming (and
vice versa-controls on greenhouse gases would yield additional reductions
in conventional air pollutants) (pp. 59, 63-64). Another example is controls
on carbon monoxide ("CO") exhaust from motor vehicles: they have been
intended to provide health benefits from pollution reduction but have had
the incidental, and much larger, benefit of reducing accidental deaths and
suicides from CO inhalation.26
p. 190. But, as we shall see, the intervening discussions seek to introduce a great many political and
values questions into cost-benefit calculations.
25. The rationalist conviction is plumbed and criticized in MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS I (Liberty Press 1991) (1962).
26. According to the authors, one study found that carbon monoxide controls reduced deaths
by accident and suicide by an average of 25,000 per year, as compared to 212 to 551 deaths (from
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Revesz and Livermore want to give equal consideration to ancillary
benefits, and think this will lead to more and more stringent regulation, because "there is no reason to think they are any less common than
countervailing risks" (pp. 58, 61). The authors do not explain this proposition. We think it is mistaken, and that both the mistake and its assertion as a
simple identity (like a rule of arithmetic) illustrate the perils of thinking
about cost-benefit analysis in terms of comprehensive social control. If one
conceives of regulation as dispensing benefits and assigning costs around an
essentially compliant society, then the ancillary effects will appear to be
random and unsystematic in relation to regulatory purposes. But if one conceives of regulation as an intervention into a market (or other social
arrangement) where individuals and organizations have durable interests and
purposes of their own, then the ancillary effects will not appear random. A
regulation will be intended to achieve a purpose that, by definition, is not
being achieved privately-but the affected individuals and organizations
will continue to pursue their independent purposes after the regulation is
imposed, and will have myriad means of doing so that are beyond the scope
of the regulation. In such a world, private responses to regulation will tend
to compromise regulatory purposes systematically rather than to compromise and amplify those purposes randomly or equally."
Our authors offer several examples of academics, policymakers, and
judges concerning themselves with risk tradeoffs, and attribute the failure to
give equal time to ancillary benefits to antiregulatory bias rather than to anything inherent in regulation itself. They offer reductions in greenhouse
gasses from controls on conventional air pollutants as an example of how
ancillary benefits could justify stricter controls, but do not offer a single example of the neglect of ancillary benefits blocking or weakening an actual
regulation. In fact, the EPA and other agencies frequently include ancillary
benefits in their benefit estimates (Retaking Rationality acknowledges a few
such cases and complains that the practice "appears to be spotty" (p. 60 n.
183)). And OIRA itself recommends that agencies account for ancillary
benefits as well as countervailing risks (Retaking Rationality applauds this
but complains that the point "takes up but half a page of the guidelines" (p.
60 n.184)). The closest we get to an actual biased result is a truck fueleconomy standard whose cost-benefit analysis failed to account for the
cancer) resulting from lower air pollution. The 25,000 figure is impossibly high-total U.S. suicides
have been in the range of 30,000 per year. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Suicide
and Self-Inflicted Injury, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/suicide.htm. The only study cited found
much lower ancillary benefits (although still much higher than direct benefits): annual reductions of
2000-3000 accidental and suicidal deaths. And the averted suicides were firom exhaust inhalation;
some people who would commit suicide by CO inhalation when the technique is available will find
other means of taking their lives, so the net suicides averted by CO controls would be less than the
reduction in exhaust suicides. This is an example of a risk tradeoff; the study mentioned the tradeoff
but did not attempt to estimate it. See p. 59; M. Shelef, Unanticipatedbenefits of automotive emission control: reduction in fatalities by motor vehicle exhaust gas, 146/147 Scd. TOTAL ENV'T 93,
98-100 (1994).
27.

See Christopher DeMuth, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RESEARCH, Unintended

Consequences and Intended Non-Consequences (2009), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/
20090608-Bradley-June.pdf.
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ancillary benefit of reduced carbon emissions-but, the authors note, the
standard was rejected by an appeals court for precisely that reason (p. 64).
There appear to be no legal, political, or intellectual (certainly not from
us) impediments to treating ancillary benefits and countervailing risks
equally in cost-benefit analysis and regulatory design. The progress of policy research and debate should therefore provide a fair measure of whether
the two phenomena arise equally, as Revesz and Livermore believe, or one
of them is far more characteristic and important, as we believe.
B. Wealth Equals Health

Typically, the costs of complying with regulations are paid in the first
instance by business firms (e.g., to install pollution-control equipment or
adjust production methods) but ultimately borne by individuals in the form
of reduced returns on investment to owners, reduced wages to employees, or
increased prices to consumers. Compliance costs thereby reduce individuals'
incomes and wealth, an effect that is separate from the risk-substitution effect discussed in the previous Part. Wealth, however, is correlated with
health-wealthier people tend to be healthier. Should a cost-benefit assessment of a regulation aimed at improving health or safety take account of
offsetting reductions in health occasioned by reductions in wealth? Revesz
and Livermore say emphatically no, because correlation does not amount to
causation. They note that it is easy to imagine causation running in the opposite direction: people who are less healthy may be less wealthy because of
their poorer health. And they point to a recent study finding that wealth and
health are not highly correlated after adjusting for education-more highly
educated people tend to be both wealthier and healthier.
Here the authors mostly stick to their polemical guns about cost-benefit
fallacies and antiregulatory skullduggery. The health-wealth tradeoff is
"pseudo logic," a statistical "rookie error," and "a sham, devoid of
meaningful content, designed to shut down regulations"; those who embrace
it believe that "health regulations should be abolished because they kill
people"; it "has been used by courts, OMB, and Congress to overturn
regulation [and] circumvent statutory prohibitions against taking costs into
account" (pp. 67, 70, 145-46). The rhetoric is strangely overwrought. The
statistical rookies who have perpetrated the health-wealth sham turn out to
include Professors W. Kip Viscusi and John Graham, Justice Stephen G.
Breyer, and Judges Frank H. Easterbrook and Richard A. Posner. That
lineup should give the reader, and should have given the authors, some
pause. The only account of the health-wealth tradeoff in action is an OIRA
rejection of a proposed OSHA regulation on that ground in 1992. The
rejection, however, incited immediate condemnation by congressional
leaders and newspapers, a Senate hearing, and an investigation by the
General Accounting Office; OIRA promptly backed down and approved the
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S 25
rule for issuance and has not been heard from on the matter since.
Beyond
this nonshutdown, we are pointed only to references to health-wealth
tradeoff issues in a few judicial opinions-all but one in concurring or
dissenting opinions and that one in an opinion upholding the regulation in
question.29
The health-wealth tradeoff is not a sham but a perfectly respectable variant of the risk-tradeoff phenomenon approved by Revesz and Livermore.
That poorer health may lead to less wealth, and that more education may
lead to both more wealth and better health, does not mean that less wealth
cannot also lead to poorer health. It is not a matter of one or the other or
right or wrong, but of degree and of the circumstances of the case at hand.
In particular, it may be true both that accidents and serious illnesses result in
loss of income and wealth and also that losses in jobs and employment opportunities result in poorer health.3 °
Consider the opinion of Judge Posner cited by Revesz and Livermore.
Writing for the court in approving (with an exception not pertinent here) a
costly OSHA rule designed to limit the exposure of dental and medical care
providers to blood-borne AIDS and Hepatitis B viruses, Judge Posner noted
that:

OSHA ... exaggerated the number of lives likely to be saved by the rule
by ignoring lives likely to be sacrificed by it, since the increased cost of
medical care, to the extent passed on to consumers, will reduce the demand
for medical care, and some people may lose their lives as a result.
This is probably not a health-wealth tradeoff at all-the reduced demand for
medical care seems to be the result of higher price, which would be a risk
tradeoff. But the reduced demand might instead or additionally be the result
of lower wealth, which would be a health-wealth tradeoff, so the example
really illustrates the similarity of the two phenomena. 32
In any event, the important point is that the pursuit of health is not the
exclusive preserve of government regulation: health is a private good as well
as a public good, something that people value and pursue all on their own.
With greater resources, individuals are in a position to pursue better health
through more or better medical care and many other means. (They are also
of course in a position to pursue things that have little or nothing to do with
better health or that are risky to health.) When regulations direct resources
28. Pp. 67-68. But the authors note darkly that OIRA may have continued to be influenced
by health-wealth thinking behind the scenes and "[w]e do know that health-wealth tradeoff analysis
has not disappeared from the public debate."
29.

The cases are cited and two of them quoted at pp. 70-71.

30. For a careful empirical study finding that job displacement, especially when accompanied by substantial loss of income, results in substantial short- and long-run increases in mortality,
see Daniel Sullivan & Till von Wachter, Job Displacement and Mortality:An Analysis Using Administrative Data, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1265 (2009).
31.

Am. Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823,826 (7th Cir. 1993).

32.

But Judge Posner does indeed subscribe to the health-wealth tradeoff. See
394-95 (7th ed. 2007).

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

RICHARD

A.
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toward health-improvement projects the government deems important, they
also direct them, to some degree, away from health-improvement projects
individuals deem important. The academic studies cited by Revesz and
Livermore, and the OIRA assessment of the OSHA rule that stirred congres-33
sional outrage, may or may not have estimated the relationship correctly,
but it is not in principle different from risk tradeoffs where risk-reducing
rules divert people to activities carrying risks of their own.
In the end, our authors concede that the issue of health-wealth tradeoffs
is "debatable '3 4 and proceed to argue that, to the extent such tradeoffs exist,
the proper response is not less costly regulations but rather redistribution.
They suggest without elaboration that regulations be designed so that compliance costs fall on people with higher rather than lower incomes, or that
they be accompanied by transfer payments, job retraining, and the like (pp.
73-75). We have no idea how the costs of complying with a health regulation could be directed to particular income groups, and greatly doubt the
feasibility of linking the government's many income-transfer and training
and development programs to regulatory decisions in any coherent way.
These are additional examples of the authors' unbounded conception of
cost-benefit analysis and the possibilities of regulatory social engineering.
They criticize "antiregulatory groups" that subscribe to the health-wealth
tradeoff for not following through with proposals for more income redistribution to compensate for regulatory costs (pp. 73-75), but it seems much
more realistic to say that health regulators should do their best at reducing
health risks without attempting to resolve other social and economic issues
along the way.
The authors also suggest that the proper role of health-wealth tradeoffs
is as "an additional justification for health and safety regulation," because
healthy citizens are more productive and increase social wealth (pp. 75-76).
Those effects, however, are already accounted for in cost-benefit analysis,
and indeed are the heart of the benefit estimate for a health or safety regulation. The health-wealth tradeoff proponents are simply proposing, so far
without success to judge by the evidence in Retaking Rationality, that the
counterbalancing effect be considered as well-as an addition on the cost
side of the ledger where statutes permit consideration of cost, or as a subtraction on the benefits side where statutes command the pursuit of health
benefits regardless of cost.

33. Revesz and Livermore assert that the 1990s studies relied on by proponents of a healthwealth tradeoff attribute all of the correlation to wealth causation. Pp. 69, 71-72. They are mistaken:
those studies, and the rich literature on the subject that has developed since, are concerned not only
with measuring the correlation but with understanding how much of it is caused by differences in
wealth, health, education, and other factors.
34. A debatable proposition cannot be pseudo logic and a sham devoid of meaningful content. This is one of many instances in Retaking Rationality of overbroad assertions later undermined
to an unexplained degree by an inconsistent concession.

April 2010]

Rationalism in Regulation

C. Older People Are Less Valuable

In estimating the benefits of regulations that reduce health and safety
risks, cost-benefit analyses traditionally counted savings of "statistical
lives," meaning that they estimated the number of fatalities from illness or
accidents that the regulations would avert. More recently, a more refined
technique has been to estimate years-of-life saved as well. The refinement is
an attempt to account for the fact that regulations do not really "save lives,"
and that measuring benefits in this manner gives an imperfect account of
their function. We all die sometime, and our lives are "saved" innumerable
times along the way (because things that might have killed us did not); all
that risk-reducing regulations can do is extend expected life spans by reducing a subset of the risks we face. But substituting actuarial years-of-life
saved for fatalities averted may suggest that regulations addressed to risks
facing younger people (say, rules requiring car seats for infants and toddlers) are more beneficial than those addressed to risks facing older people
(say, rules aimed at reducing the incidence of cancers and other diseases of
older age)-and therefore justify greater expenditures.
Revesz and Livermore believe that the years-saved refinement "must be
abandoned" because it is "theoretically incoherent and empirically ungrounded" and "leads to the fallacy that older people are less valuable than
younger people" (pp. 84, 146). Their first argument is that an additional year
of life is more valuable to older people because they have actuarially fewer
years left to live in any event-getting to 76 from 75 is a bigger benefit to
someone who is 70 than to someone who is 20, and the 70-year-old is likely
to have more discretionary wealth and therefore more willingness to pay for
the additional year. That is a weak argument, because the issue is not the
purchase of an additional year of life but the purchase of a reduction in a
particular health or safety risk against a background of other risks (upside
and downside) that will vary with age. On this score, the authors direct us to
several theoretical models and empirical studies. The studies point every
which way-to greater willingness to pay for risk reduction among younger
people, older people, and people in their middle years when earnings and
obligations are greatest. Because these studies are inconclusive, and because
life-years proponents simply estimate years saved without estimating the
differential values of risk reduction to older and younger people, the authors
conclude that cost-benefit analyses should be limited to estimating numbers
of lives saved-"the gold standard for estimating the value of life-saving
regulations" (p. 146).
The authors' plenary opposition to measuring regulatory benefits by lifeyears saved is puzzling. For one thing, the issue fits particularly poorly into
their storyline of bricks in a Berlin Wall blocking good regulations. We are
given the hypothetical example of EPA ozone rules, which primarily benefit
people in ill health with lower life expectancy, and which therefore might be
scaled back if benefits were measured by years saved instead of lives saved.
But that has not happened, and various efforts during the George W. Bush
Administration to introduce years-saved estimates were as additions (not
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substitutes) to lives-saved estimates. And even these efforts, we learn, were
abandoned in the face of objections from senior citizens' groups to a "senior
death discount." The outcry arose over an EPA cost-benefit test of an air pollution rule similar to, and perhaps the source of, our authors' hypothetical. But
the EPA's capitulation was even more abject than OIRA's on the health-wealth
tradeoff issue discussed in the previous Part of this Review-because, entirely
unmentioned by the authors, the EPA rule
• passed the test
35 according to the
years-saved approach as well as the lives-saved approach. Once again we are
without any evidence of antiregulation forces rolling back regulation; on the
contrary, this episode is said to demonstrate that "if progressive groups get
involved in the conversation over how cost-benefit analysis is conducted, they
can prevail, especially if they stand on the moral and rational high ground, as
they did on this issue" (p. 84).
But the deeper puzzle involves the substance of the issue. Lives saved is
not a gold standard; insisting that regulators ignore the years of life saved by
their rules is not a rational high ground; the AARP's publicity campaign
against the EPA study was not a moral high ground; and taking account of
years saved is not "antiregulation." Revesz and Livermore are correct that
focusing exclusively on years saved can produce analytical and ethical dilemmas, but an exclusive focus on lives saved can produce parallel
dilemmas." If the years-saved approach can be said to yield a "senior death
discount" compared to a lives-saved approach, it does so only to the extent
that the lives-saved approach yields a "junior death discount." Some rules
are addressed to risks of infancy, childhood, and youth, others to risks of
older age, and others to risks that do not discriminate by age-and no one
has any idea whether lives saved or years saved would result in more or
stricter regulations on net. In practice, estimating years saved is inescapable
in assessing the benefits of regulations that affect morbidity-the duration
and severity of disease under different policies-and the approach has been
applied to mortality reduction (often in the same rules) in many cases without
political controversy.37 That has been so even after the EPA recanted its years-

35. Robert Hahn & Scott Wallsten, Whose Life Is Worth More? (And Why Is It Horrible to
Ask?), WASH. POST, June 1, 2003, at B3. See generally John Tiemey, Life: The Cost-Benefit Analysis, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, § 4, at 14.
36. Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205,
214-16 (2004).
37.

See, e.g., id. at 252 (listing several case examples in the appendix); cf INST. OF MEDI-

CINE OF THE NAT'L ACADS., VALUING HEALTH FOR REGULATORY COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

(Wilhelmine Miller et al. eds., 2006) (providing recommendations regarding the measurement of
health and safety improvements using cost-effective analysis). Forbidding life-years-saved estimates
is particularly odd where regulations have both morbidity and mortality benefits: morbidity benefits
are perforce measured by extended years of life, so the best way to characterize aggregate mortality
and morbidity benefits is by measuring mortality benefits in the same manner. See, e.g., U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 815-R-05-010: APPENDICES TO THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR
THE FINAL STAGE 2 DISINFECTANTS AND DISINFECTION BYPRODUCTS RULE, VOLUME MH (I-N)

(2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/disinfection/stage2/pdfs/analysis-stage2economic.appendix3.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 815-R-06--001: APFENDICES TO
THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL LONG TERM 2 ENHANCED SURFACE WATER TREATMENT
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saved assessment in the case celebrated by Revesz and Livermore-in the
Obama as well as Bush Administrations." And years-saved analysis is likely
to continue in circumstances where our authors will find it difficult to allege
antiregulatory bias. In 1996, when the Clinton Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") attempted to regulate the marketing of cigarettes to children
and adolescents, it measured the benefits by years saved as well as lives
saved-without anyone complaining that it had introduced a "junior death
premium." 9 The rule was vacated on jurisdictional grounds. 4° Now the FDA
has been given jurisdiction.4 The rule will be back soon.
We think Revesz and Livermore object to estimating years of life saved
because they are attempting to accomplish too much by cost-benefit protocol. Some things, such as improved visibility and other aesthetic values and
the psychic satisfaction of wilderness preservation, cannot be quantified
beyond extremely broad and uncertain ranges of value. In such cases, the
important analytical task is to set out the costs so that public officials can
make informed decisions on how much to purchase. The differential value
of reducing risks to people at various stages of the life cycle is certainly one
of those things. The solution is not to restrict the amount of readily available
information laid out in a regulatory analysis: the better approach is to augment lives-saved estimates with simple unadjusted years-saved estimates in
cases where the additional information seems pertinent. Where two equally
effective regulations would affect populations of the same size, one of oldsters and one of youngsters, the benefit assessment would show the same
number of lives saved for both rules but more years of life saved by the
youngsters rule. That is true information, and, according to the empirical
and theoretical literature cited by the authors, the analyst doesn't have much
more to tell the decisionmaker about what to make of it.42 The result of the
full-disclosure approach may even be proregulation: if controlling the risks
facing different age groups is left to informed political choice, we may find
that protecting children gets a special boost, and protecting the elderly also
gets a special boost, and protecting hard-working moms and dads all across
America gets a special boost too.

RULE, VOLUME H (H-U) (2005), available at www.epa.gov/safewater/disinfectionlt2/pdfs/
anaylis lt2economicappendix2.pdf.

38. Food Labeling; Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and
Health Claims; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,487-90 (July 11, 2003); Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, Storage, and Transportation; Final Rule, 74 Fed.
Reg. 33,029, 33,054-56 (July 9, 2009).
39. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
to Protect Children and Adolescents; Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,395, 44,568-69 (Aug. 28, 1996)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
40.

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
41. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776, 1786-87, available at http://acscan.org/pdf/protectkids/Family-Smoking-Preventionand-Tobacco-Control-Act.pdf.
42. We are, however, happy to see continued refinement of willingness-to-pay estimates for
reductions in risks to different age groups.
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D. People CannotAdapt

A further refinement of lives-saved estimates is to consider not only life
years saved but the quality of the saved years. The result--quality-adjusted
life years ("QALYs")-takes us over a critical threshold. To measure regulatory benefits by lives saved or life years saved is to deal with, in principle,
objective facts. To value those benefits by willingness to pay, as revealed by
private decisions involving risk, is to gauge public risk-reduction expenditures by similar (albeit usually implicit) expenditures people make in their
private lives. But valuing benefits by the quality of years saved-say, years
in dialysis or in a wheelchair versus years in good health-is to introduce an
irreducible element of subjectivity (and in an area where interpersonal comparisons are often erratic).
Retaking Rationality makes a persuasive case that the government's
judging the quality of citizens' lives is generally unsound, unhelpful, and
unpopular, and is often ethically problematic to boot. 43 But the discussion is
marred, once again, by its abstract, absolutist character and failure to consider that those who are dubious but not abolitionist about QALYs may have
a serious point or two. If one were considering the benefits of a regulation to
reduce the incidence of infections acquired in hospitals, would it make sense
to count reductions in death rates among patients in permanent vegetative
states equally with those among mothers and newborns on the maternity
ward? The effort to force cost-benefit issues into the antiregulationproregulation construct is particularly unproductive in the QALY discussion.
The authors point to no case where QALY considerations determined or
were even considered in a regulatory decision aimed at saving lives. Their
warning that QALYs are nevertheless "on the horizon" and "must never get
off the ground" is based on a few academic papers and on references-all of
them nuanced and tentative-in two OIRA reports and one judicial decision
that was reversed on other grounds (pp. 87-89, 146).
E. PeopleAlways Want to Put Off Bad Things

Intertemporal discounting is the practice of aligning the values of regulatory benefits and costs, for purposes of cost-benefit comparison, in
circumstances where costs are incurred before benefits begin to materialize.
An important case, and the focus of the discussion in Retaking Rationality,
is health and environmental regulations whose pollution-reduction costs
begin immediately and whose benefits begin in later years-because the
health effects of the pollutants would have been cumulative and/or because

43. We know that government quality-of-life rulings are unpopular from Oregon's experience with rationing medical care according to patients' health status (discussed in RETAKING
RATIONALITY at pp. 85-87) and from the strong public reaction, in the 2009 debates over the Obama
Administration's health-care proposals, to the prospect of similar rationing at the national level. See
Scott Gottlieb & Elizabeth DuPre, The Living Truth about "Death Panels", HEALTH POL'Y OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 7, 2009, availableat www.aei.org/outlook/100073.
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the diseases averted would have had long latency periods." The lower the
rate used to discount future benefits to the time when costs are incurred, the
higher the estimate of a rule's net benefits. Revesz and Livermore refer to
many discount-rate tussles among the regulatory agencies, OIRA, and the
courts, and point to one important case, Corrosion ProofFittings v. EPA, in
which the court vacated and remanded the H.W. Bush Administration's asbestos ban.4'5 The court criticized the EPA for failing to discount health
benefits at all for the (typically lengthy) periods between asbestos exposure
and the manifestation of disease, and directed the EPA to employ a reasonable discount rate on remand. 6
That would be a smoking pistol-an accurate example of an antiregulation fallacy blocking a worthwhile regulation-except that (a) the EPA's
failure
to discount benefits was not among the grounds for the court's deciS47
sion, and (b) the authors are not opposed to intertemporal discounting at
all-indeed they support it. Their argument is instead that discount rates for
latency-period benefits should take account of the postexposure dread that
people might experience, in the absence of the regulation, in anticipating the
risks of acquiring a disease in the future, and of the fact that occupational
and environmental risks may be considered involuntary rather than voluntary (because people are more averse to involuntary risks). But the
discussion of these factors is amorphous and provides no idea of how significant the adjustment would be or what difference it would make. The
authors object to using "a straight discount rate borrowed from the Wall
Street Journal financial pages" (p. 146), but that is essentially never done.
The EPA's discount rate for preexposure future benefits in the asbestos case
was three percent, and the OMB's current guidance document for regulatory
analyses advises that rates of both three percent and seven percent should
customarily be employed.48

F We Are Worth More Than Our Children
Where the lag time between regulatory costs and benefits is not merely
intertemporal but intergenerational-that is, where regulations impose costs
44. But discounting issues are ubiquitous in regulatory policy. Energy efficiency regulations,
for example, trade higher up-front product prices for lower energy expenditures over the life of the
products. See Gloria Helfand & Ann Wolverton, Evaluating the Consumer Response to Fuel Economy: A Review of the Literature (U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nat'l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ., Working
Paper No. 09-94, 2009).
45.

947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).

46.

Id. at 1218-19.

47. The court's decision was based on the EPA's failure to follow statutory requirements and
judicial precedent (under the Toxic Substances Control Act) and substantial irregularities in the
rulemaking proceedings and record, all unrelated to the issue of discounting future benefits. The
criticism of the EPA's failure to discount latency-period benefits was one of several "concerns"
expressed by the court "[iun order to aid the EPA's reconsideration of this and other cases." Id.
48. Circular A-4 from U.S. Office of Mgmt. and Budget to the Heads of Executive
Agencies and Establishments 32 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/omb/circulars/aOO4/a-4.pdf.
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today whose benefits will accrue to future generations now unborn-the
discounting issues become trickier and more ethically fraught. Discounting
benefits over many decades suggests that averting enormous future catastrophes merits only trivial current efforts, but failing to discount suggests
indifference between saving lives today and saving them far in the future.
The Revesz-Livermore discussion of intergenerational discounting is
competent but restricted and at points tendentious. On the critical question
of the unpredictability of the distant future, they dispute two arguments for
intergenerational discounting: that future generations will be much richer
and more proficient than the present one if current rates of economic growth
and technological progress continue, and that the human race might be
wiped out by an asteroid or nuclear war before the problem we are trying to
avert comes to pass (pp. 111-113). But these are only two among innumerable possible developments that, taken together, are likely to make the
remote future very different from what we can imagine or project today. It is
the totality of cumulative contingencies over long periods of time, not technophilia or worries about asteroids, that should give any sensible person
pause over large current investments to address one future problem-a problem we can conceive of today but whose nature may change fundamentally
over generations to come. The authors' obliviousness to this issue is dramatized by a silly example: "Discounting the value of regulatory benefits that
accrue to future generations is as arbitrary as discounting benefits affecting
people west of the Mississippi River-unfair and unjustifiable" (p. 146). But
we know fully as much about the circumstances of people on the west side
of the Mississippi as we do of people on the east side. To eliminate the dimension of time is to eliminate the very issue discounting seeks to address.
Revesz and Livermore agree that we should consider the opportunity
costs of current regulation (the alternative uses society would make of the
resources regulation would command) and weigh the consequences for future generations of regulatory versus private exertions (pp. 113-14). 49 But
their main concern is to prevent these and other considerations from leading
to any discounting of future benefits against current costs-"discounting in
the intergenerational context amounts to punting one of the most important
moral questions of our time" (p. 146).50 They recommend that moral obligations be addressed through such concepts as sustainable development and
intergenerational distributive and corrective justice (pp. 116-17, 146)-yet
still they regard it as essential that such inquiries stand alongside undiscounted rather than discounted benefits. 51
49. This however merely recasts the dilemma of projecting our current knowledge over long
periods into the future.
50. The authors immediately repeat the point: "We cannot punt on this issue, and must face
up to the fundamentally moral question of what we owe future generations." P. 146.
51.
The authors dismiss as simply "wrong" the suggestion of Cass Sunstein and Arden Rowell that intergenerational benefits be discounted and ethical and political obligations to future
generations be considered separately. P. 110. But the Revesz-Livermore and Sunstein-Rowell approaches to ethical and distributive issues are similar, so the difference between right and wrong is
whether benefits estimates are discounted at all. Comparepp. 116-17, 146, with Cass R. Sunstein &

Rationalism in Regulation

April 2010]

It seems to us that the authors are once again trying to load cost-benefit
analysis with too much ethical and political freight. As a practical matter, it
probably makes little difference whether the benefits of averting distant
problems are discounted fully, partially, or not at all. Current U.S. government deficits-which amount to sending enormous bills to our
grandchildren to pay for our own consumption-suggest that the American
people, or in any event American politicians, are not overly concerned with
our obligations to future generations. Not discounting intergenerational
benefits may be intended to generate large, scary numbers to stimulate ethical and political debate, but our deficit and debt numbers are already large
and scary. The only live regulatory controversy Revesz and Livermore mention in connection with intergenerational discounting is climate-change
policy; they acknowledge that discounting "may not be the driving cause"
for the failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and emphasize conventional political causes. But it is an overstatement to say that discounting is
"at least a powerful means of justifying that inaction" (p. 109). The media
have been filled for many years with accounts of horrific future consequences of global warming, to little policy avail. At least where policy
controversies are out in the public square rather than embedded in regulatory and judicial proceedings, to-discount-or-not-to-discount distant benefits
is a distinctly subsidiary question.
G. People Only Value What They Use

The "existence value" of natural resources is the value people attach to
the mere existence of wilderness areas and living species that they expect
never to experience personally or to derive any economic benefit from. It is
one of many examples of aesthetic, psychic, and moral benefits of environmental protection that are indubitably real but extremely difficult to measure
for quantitative balancing in a cost-benefit assessment (because of the absence of immediate or derivative markets that reveal exchange value and
willingness to pay). One would think that existence values could therefore
be left unpriced in a cost-benefit analysis: like questions of distributive justice and the differential claims of younger, older, and future generations,
Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and IntergenerationalEquity, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (2007) (part of a superb symposium volume on intergenerational equity and
discounting) and p. 110.
52. Pp. 107-09. It is worth noting, however, that the climate-change debates concerning
benefit discounting have been vigorous and sophisticated and have not obscured, but rather have
illuminated, the issues of ethical obligations to future generations, uncertainties over future states,
and the opportunity costs of immediate regulation to populations that would be particularly affected
by climate change. See, e.g., WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES (2008); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF

(1998); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
The Stem Review (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent-reviews/stem_
review-economics-climate-change/sternreview-index.cfm; Thomas C. Schelling, What Makes
Greenhouse Sense?, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2002, at 2 (2002); David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future:A Guidefor the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 433 (2009); William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, 45 J. EcON. LIT. 686 (2007) (book review).
GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION
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they could be described in qualitative terms and their value left to the decisions of political officials. But the monetizers have been busy with existence
values--conducting surveys of how much people say they would pay to protect a given wilderness area or other resource and introducing the results
into regulatory cost-benefit analyses and private litigation. The purpose,
clearly, is to put a price on the priceless and thereby give political officials a
nudge.
Revesz and Livermore provide a good account of the shortcomings of
stated-preference surveys and of various suggestions that have been made
for improving them. They conclude only that the criticisms "are not sufficiently strong to justify abandoning this significant set of preferences" and
that "[e]xistence-value studies should follow best practices" and "state-ofthe-art techniques" (p. 129). In our view they give short shrift to the most
fundamental difficulty with existence-value surveys, which is that the world
includes an endless number of things, of which environmental things are
only a subset, that people value and will put a price on if asked. That means
that "agenda control"-which things get asked about and which do not-is
paramount. Our authors acknowledge the problem but are happy with the
current agenda-"we should focus our analytic energies on the class of existence values we know to be important, namely natural resources existence
values" (p. 126).
In the meantime, we have yet another fallacy that has not blocked any
environmental efforts-"challenges to existence value have thus far been
mostly unsuccessful, and the technique is now used widely in cost-benefit
analysis" (p. 125). The authors note that the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, which is
their leading illustration of existence values, eventuated in damage and penalty payments far greater than the tangible economic damages of the spillsuggesting public recognition of the need for a "fuller reckoning from the
company." 3 They also note that Exxon-Valdez prompted legislation providing for liability for destruction of natural resources, and that a contemporary
court of appeals decision approved consideration of nonuse values under the
Superfund program (p. 128). Their evidence of "some success" in "a campaign to erode support for the use of stated-preference studies of existence
value" is a 2002 OMB/OIRA report that identified but did not monetize existence values for a forest preservation rule in a list of proposed regulations
(p. 121). But the list was actually of final rules that OIRA had approved.4

53. P. 121. The Supreme Court subsequently reduced one major assessment arising from the
Exxon-Valdez oil spill punitive damages in a class-action suit under maritime law. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008). But Revesz and Livermore did not even consider
the stakes in that case in comparing tangible damages with total payments to date; so the case's
conclusion reinforces their point, but by less than it might have.
54. P. 121, n. 358. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT.& BUDGET, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULA2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED

TION:

MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES

47-49, 50 tbl.9 (2002).
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H. Industry Cannot Adapt
Retaking Rationality's final cost-benefit chapter is a thorough discussion
of the tendency for regulatory compliance costs to turn out to be less than
estimated at the time of rulemaking. Realized costs are less than projected
costs because of "learning by doing" and innovation in the course of complying with rules; the pursuit of efficient regulatory compliance is
particularly strong where rules are based on market incentives rather than
technological command and control. The tendency is clearly important and
systematic, but it is not clear that it has operated to constrain the issuance of
regulations (the authors suggest no instances) or that it amounts to a criticism of cost-benefit analysis, or any of its methodological particulars, at all.
Cost-benefit analysis is an effort to estimate the consequences of a course of
action foreseeable at the time the action is undertaken. Imperfect foresight is
not limited to compliance costs-as we have seen, it is a critical component
of the argument for discounting intergenerational benefits-and is hardly an
argument for more aggressive regulation.
Although Revesz and Livermore are persuasive that lack of foresight
will lead systematically to overestimation of regulatory costs, they say nothing about regulatory benefits, where overestimation is also systematic. Many
(not all) health, safety, and environmental regulations aim to produce improvements in areas that are already improving and can be expected to
continue improving independently of regulation. Efficiency in manufacturing and power generation (resulting in less wasted energy and less
uncompensated byproduct in the form of pollution), workplace safety and
health, highway safety, and the safety of many consumer products were improving before the establishment of the relevant regulatory programs in the
1970s-so there is no reason to credit regulation with all of the subsequent
improvements." The preregulation improvements reflected increased public
demand for health, safety, and environmental goods and increased technological capacity to supply those demands-developments that were
instrumental in generating effective political support for regulation. Of
course, the enactment of the regulatory programs indicates that the rate of
progress was considered inadequate, as it certainly was in the case of air and
water pollution. But that does not gainsay the fact that regulatory improvements will be complemented by continued private improvements resulting
from market demand and technological advances (augmented in many cases
by tort liability). To say that assessments of regulatory effectiveness should
take account of private innovations that reduce costs but ignore private innovations that increase benefits would be proregulation indeed-and
completely arbitrary from the standpoint of social welfare.
A glimpse of the relationship between regulatory requirements and natural technological progress is provided by the George W. Bush
Administration's unsuccessful effort to relax "New Source Review"

55.
LUTION

See INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL
(1999); PELTZMAN, supra note 8; DeMuth, supranote 27.

STORY OF THE WAR ON AIR POL-
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requirements for old power plants needing engineering upgrades. Revesz
and Livermore mention the episode elsewhere in their book, saying that "[it
is inconceivable that weakening the New Source Review provision ...
would result in a net benefit for the environment" (p. 154).16 But it is not
inconceivable-it was one of the central policy questions in the effort.7
Older, "grandfathered" power plants are subject to less strict pollution standards than new plants, and that creates artificial incentives for utilities to
keep older plants in operation. A longstanding EPA enforcement conundrum
has been when to treat engineering improvements in old plants as triggering
stricter "New Source" requirements. The Bush initiative was based on the
hunch that permitting more substantial renovations without New Source
Review would lead to a faster rate of pollution reduction (along with efficiencies in power generation) through more frequent maintenance and
upgrades. It was only a hunch, and only a second-best expedient for coping
with the differential in pollution requirements. 58 But it was an informed
hunch, based on the experience of numerous enforcement cases that had
resulted in lengthy delays in plant maintenance. And it risked little, because
a concurrent cap-and-trade initiative would have provided added incentives
for pollution-reducing engineering upgrades while eliminating the possibility that they would increase net pollution.5 9
Our ability to foresee benefit-increasing innovations is as limited as our
ability to foresee cost-reducing innovations. Revesz and Livermore recommend the use of "prediction markets" and more diligent efforts to assess
regulations ex post; these are excellent ideas, and although the authors recommend them only for costs we assume they would not object to applying
them to benefits as well.

I. The Sum ofAll Nonfallacies
Retaking Rationality's tour of the cost-benefit horizon does not come
close to showing that the authors' version of rationality has been lost and
needs to be reclaimed nor that rationality per se is capable of resolving the
open issues in regulatory policy. This is impressive. Our tour guides are exceptionally intelligent, knowledgeable, and committed: if cost-benefit
56. The effort to relax New Source Review requirements for engineering renovations would
be an accurate example of a regulatory rollback (by the authors' lights). But it is offered not as an
example of a cost-benefit fallacy but rather of the inconsistency of OIRA review (because no costbenefit analysis was performed for this "deregulatory" initiative). In any event, the New Source
requirements were never relaxed; the rules were vacated in New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir.
2006) and New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
57.

See

GRAHAM,

supra note 17, at 201-04; Randall Lutter, Rationalizing Air Pollution,

REG., Spring 2002, at 13.

58. A key dilemma was that improved efficiency in power generation could lead to increased
output and therefore increased pollution even when pollution per unit of output was reduced.
59. See Juliet Eilperin, Bush Pollution Curbs Are Rated Equal to Clinton's, WASH. POST,
July 22, 2006, at A5. This effort, too, came to naught. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896
(D.C. Cir 2008). Revesz and Livermore do not mention this critical aspect of the New Source Review initiative.
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analysis had blocked or rolled back important regulatory initiatives, they
certainly would have told us. Instead we learn that many of the analytical
refinements they dislike, such as health-wealth tradeoffs and life-yearssaved valuations, have themselves been blocked by old-fashioned politics,
often motivated by the book's primary audience of cost-benefit-hostile environmental activists. More thorough application of the authors' analytical
preferences-low or zero discounting of future regulatory benefits, and
stated-preference valuation of selected natural resources-would no doubt
lead to a fuller agenda of regulatory proposals that look good on paper
vying for political attention. And this might in turn lead to more and stricter
rules and more social resources devoted to complying with (and working
around) those rules. But the desirability of that result cannot be determined
by abstract principle, and an empirical demonstration would require a richer
understanding of the interactions between government rules and private decisionmaking than the authors provide.
Our own reading of the chapters is that the introduction of regulatory
cost-benefit analysis has been a considerable achievement. The procedure
has increased the transparency and accountability of agency rulemaking,
flushed out some of the more vacuous special-interest arguments for and
against regulation, and narrowed and clarified many worthy, important policy disagreements. There is reason to hope that continued cost-benefit
debate can yield further improvements-better understanding of the nature
of our political differences and better, more public-interested policies. But
cost-benefit analysis is a technique for better politics, not politics itself. Investing it with too much capacity to settle political differences and extend
government regulation, rather than to narrow political differences and clarify
regulatory purposes and results, undermines its essential functions.
III. RATIONALIZING REGULATORY REVIEW?

The third and final part of Retaking Rationality turns to the institutional
environment in which rules proposed by the regulatory agencies are reviewed by OIRA. After criticizing the current review process but allowing
that it is not beyond reform, the authors summarize their prescription as follows:
[A] new executive order to define a new role for [OIRA] is needed. This
executive order would set out new guidelines for how OIRA is to approach
cost-benefit analysis by changing the focus away from checking agencies
and toward agenda-setting and the calibration of regulatory stringency.
Further, the executive order will prioritize the non-cost-benefit analysis
function of OIRA, including interagency coordination and harmonization,
and distributional analysis. (p. 171)
Revesz and Livermore justify their new vision for OIRA review in two
steps. First, they attempt to debunk the argument in favor of centralized regulatory review insofar as it is based upon the president's need to counter the
influence of special interests in order to exert his own influence. Then they
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reconceptualize regulatory review as a way to counter the bias against regulation they claim inheres in cost-benefit analysis. In Part II we noted our
disagreement with the authors' view that cost-benefit analysis is not merely
a tool to help policymakers reach informed decisions about political questions but a device for social engineering that can subsume many of these
political questions. We have the same objection to their vision of centralized
regulatory review. In arguing against the presidential conirol model and in
favor of their proposed reforms, they seek to recast centralized regulatory
review as a purely rational, apolitical tool-social engineering turned upon
the government itself. In this vision, the purpose of OIRA review is not to
enable the president to exercise authority over the administrative state but
rather to optimize the work of the regulatory agencies.
We have in the past argued, as Revesz and Livermore restate our point,
"because the president is responsible to a national constituency, he (or she)
will be less sensitive to the kinds of special-interest pressure that might
dominate the agencies. ' 60 Being subject to direct presidential control, OIRA
is similarly less sensitive to special-interest pressure. Revesz and Livermore
posit two objections to this observation-that the president is no less subject
to special-interest pressures than are the regulatory agencies, and that even if
he is, he cannot keep OIRA from succumbing to those pressures any more
effectively than he can keep a regulatory agency from doing so.
To our claim that the president is less susceptible to interest-group pressures than are regulatory agencies, the authors respond that "[e]xperience
and theory... show that this hope is not well founded" (p. 167). To support
that assertion, they first point out that "the president will be attentive to
those groups that can provide him with the resources, support, and votes to
win elections for himself and his party" (p. 167), citing a point in our 1986
article at which we say "[a]lthough presidents and legislatures are themselves vulnerable to pressure from politically influential groups, the
rulemaking process-operating in relative obscurity from public view but
lavishly attended by interest groups-is even more vulnerable. ' 6 While we
recognized that presidents are subject to interest-group pressures, it is surely
incorrect to suggest, as Revesz and Livermore do, that they are no less likely
than are specialized administrative agencies to succumb to such pressures.
The only other support the authors provide for their attempted refutation is a
pair of thin anecdotes about Republican vice presidents influencing regulatory policy and their own conclusory declaration, based upon one such
anecdote, that "[e]xperience with direct presidential-level review of agency
decisionmaking" in the Administration of George H.W. Bush was "atrocious" (p. 167). This is weak tea, indeed.
Revesz and Livermore not only fail to persuade with the evidence they
do present, they fail to grapple with the evidence against their claim. In particular, they do not mention a certain empirical study of OIRA's review of
several thousand rules which was designed specifically to test whether
60.

P. 166 (citing DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1082).

61.

DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1081.
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OIRA was influenced by special-interest pressures. Some of the study's
findings directly support our view that presidential control of OIRA is relatively insulated against special-interest pressures and undermine Revesz and
Livermore's anecdotal argument to the contrary:
The fact that the White House met only with broad-based interests concerning some rule under review, or only with narrow interests, or both, has
no apparent bearing on the likelihood that the White House would require
a change in the rule....

The fact that the economic significance of a rule is no predictor of change
casts further doubt on the idea that the White House uses the review process as a cover to benefit politically powerful groups.62
This study is cited eight times in a 2006 article that Dean Revesz coauthored, 63 but Retaking Rationality does not mention it at all-even though
the earlier article is listed in the Acknowledgements of prior work upon
which the authors are drawing (p. 195).
After arguing the president and OIRA are as vulnerable to interest
groups as the regulatory agencies, the authors challenge the point, which we
advanced in 1986, that centralized review is necessary if the president is to
put his stamp upon the regulations issued by his administration, for which
he will be held accountable politically. Here the authors' claim is that the
president can control the program agencies just as effectively as he can control 0IRA. 6
As a preliminary matter, the authors' claim completely misses a key
point: regardless whether the president can control OIRA more or less effectively than he can control an agency, with centralized review he has to
control only one rather than many agency heads. 65 To confront the book's
argument on its own terms, however, we think the authors have an uninformed and quite mistaken view of the relationship between OIRA and the
president. Although the administrator of OIRA and the heads of the program
agencies are alike presidential appointees, they operate in very different environments and have different incentives. OIRA, which is a part of the OMB
62. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 860, 875 (2003). Croley found some conflicting evidence concerning
OIRA's sensitivity to interest group pressure, but found that "[m]ost of the data [in the study] go
farther to assuage fears about presidential involvement in rulemaking than they do to accentuate
those fears." Id. at 879.
63. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1268 n.38, 1289 n.182, 1298 n.231, 1305 n.264, 1307 nn.275, 277 &
279, 1310 n.294 (2006).
64. "It is nearly as difficult for the President to personally keep track of the goings-on at
OIRA as it would be to keep track of the internal workings of a regulatory agency." P. 167.
65. OIRA's annual reports typically report on the regulations of about thirty executive branch
agencies and another nine so-called "independent" agencies. See, e.g., U.S. OFCE OF MGMT. AND
BUDGET, DRAFT 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (Sept. 21, 2009),

available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg-regpol-reports-congress.
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and therefore of the Executive Office of the President, is charged primarily
with implementing the president's policies in a way that the heads of the
program agencies cannot be counted upon to do. OIRA's success or failure
reflects directly upon the president, whether his electoral platform called for
more or less aggressive regulatory policies than those of the preceding administration. The OMB director, who typically represents OIRA in White
House councils and before the president when an agency appeals an OIRA
decision, invariably has a closer working relationship with the president than
has the head of any regulatory agency-regardless whether it is (like
OSHA) or is not (like the EPA) part of a department with a cabinet secretary
to champion its interests before the president. 66
The head of a regulatory agency such as the EPA or the FDA does not
typically have a close working relationship with the president who appoints
him or her. On the contrary, it is not uncommon that the two will never have
met before the president offers the appointee the post. The appointee will
have neither a tie of personal loyalty nor a regular relationship with the
president from which a sense of common purpose might grow and be nurtured.
Of course, the president will seek to appoint someone whom he has reason to believe shares his policy perspective, at least at a fairly general level.
It would be surprising, however, if the president had any particular idea
about how the FDA should change its regulatory activity during his administration or how the EPA should administer some provision of the Clean Air
Act, apart from possibly a sense that the agencies have been "too lax" or
"too aggressive" during the preceding administration. Thus, Presidents Carter and Reagan campaigned
on the premise that the regulatory agencies had
S 67
been overly aggressive and President Obama campaigned on the opposite
plank." The people they chose to head OIRA, in addition to having expert
knowledge in the field of regulation itself (typically a background in economics, administrative law, risk assessment, or cost-benefit analysis)
presumably shared that general view.

66. The current OIRA administrator, Cass R. Sunstein, is himself a friend and former academic colleague of President Obama. In our experience, the OIRA administrator is closely involved
in the selection of regulatory agency heads when vacancies occur.
67. See, e.g., ROWLAND EVANS, JR. & ROBERT NOVAK, THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 142
(1981) (noting that, while campaigning, Reagan "blamed empty steel mills and long lines of unemployed on EPA zeal"); James F Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the
President:An Overview and PolicyAnalysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 859 (2001) (finding that deregulation was a "centerpiece" of Reagan's presidential campaign). President Carter's
campaign had a similar theme. See, e.g., Andrew Downer Crain, Ford, Caner,and Deregulationin
the 1970s, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 413, 431 (2007) ("During his presidential campaign, Carter promised to pursue deregulation."); see also Mark A. Goldberg, Theory and Practice,
25 YALE J. ON REG. 326, 326 (2008) ("President Carter had promised, during his successful campaign in 1976, to reorganize the federal bureaucracy, to increase its effectiveness and efficiency, and
to streamline regulation.").

68. See, e.g., BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: OBAMA AND BIDEN'S PLAN FOR AMERICA (2008),
available at http://www.bamckobama.com/pdf/ObamaBlueprintForChange.pdf (proposing in general terms more regulation of agriculture, antitrust, finance, consumer credit, education, the
environment, energy, health care, housing, and the workplace).

Rationalism in Regulation

April 2010]

The Office of Presidential Personnel is entrusted with identifying people
to head the regulatory agencies from among those candidates who are both
qualified by specialized knowledge and generally agree with the president
about the direction in which regulation should go.60 Once confirmed,
however, the agency head is unlikely to have regular contact with the
president, apart perhaps from some ceremonial occasion, such as the
dedication of a new facility or attendance at the White House Christmas
party. It falls instead to the administrator of OIRA to keep up the day-to-day
working relationship with the agency head on behalf of the president.
From the day they are nominated, agency heads spend most of their time
with agency staff, members and staff of congressional oversight committees,
and regulated parties and other "stakeholders" in their agencies' decisions.
Inevitably, they become subject to pressures that may conflict not only with
each other but with the policies of the president. Before confirmation these
pressures are brought to bear by senators who request a "courtesy call" from
the nominee that takes the form of a chat in the senator's office, during
which the senator seeks from the nominee a commitment to some policy he
wants to see pursued or some constituent interest he wants protected. These
interests may be reiterated at the nominee's confirmation hearing in order to
get his commitment on the public record.70
The conflicting pressures continue once the agency head is confirmed.
The career staff of the agency has an agenda that may or may not align with
the preferences of the agency head. He will have implicitly to negotiate with
the staff to elicit the proposals and regulations he wants and will inevitably
have to compromise along the way. The staff will have already done substantial work upon some regulatory initiatives, and may have taken one
particular direction and forsaken all others; indeed, the senior staff or a prior
political appointee may have made commitments to stakeholders and congressional oversight committees that cannot as a practical matter be
abandoned.
The trade press, interest groups, and congressional overseers will also
exert considerable pressure upon the agency head. In many cases, those
pressures will conflict with one another, and some if not all will conflict
with the agency head's own preferences (not to mention the philosophy of
69.
OFFICE

JAMES P. PFIFFNER, BROOKINGS INST., RECRUITING EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEADERS: THE
OF

PRESIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL

(2001), http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/spring_

governance.pfiffner.aspx ("The obligations of the OPP are threefold-to serve the nation by recruit-

ing executive branch leaders, to serve the president by finding qualified loyalists, and to shepherd
nominees through the sometimes treacherous appointment process.").
70. Illustrative is the experience of President Obama's nominee to be administrator of the
EPA. At her confirmation hearing, Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland began his statement as follows:
I've had the chance to talk with ... you in my office so you know the first issue I'm going to
bring up, and that is the Chesapeake Bay .... We don't want to see press releases, we want to
see results in the cleaning up of the bay .... I thank you for your willingness to make that a
priority of your agenda.
Nomination of Lisa Jackson to be Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency: Hearing
Before the S. Env't and Pub. Works Comm., 111th Cong., at *14 (2009) (Statement of Sen. Ben
Cardin) (LEXIS, Federal News Service File).
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the president). Somehow the agency head must harness the energy of the
staff, satisfy the relevant congressmen, defend himself against leaks and
other attacks in the trade press relevant to his programs, and yet maintain his
credibility with all concerned. 7' It will be no surprise if, left to swim in these
treacherous waters, the agency head loses sight, sooner or later, of the shore
from which he set off to implement the president's general policy preferences.
In sum, the president has much less control over agency heads than he
does over OIRA: he has less contact with agency heads, and those heads are
also subjected to considerable pressure from sources other than the president. In fact, the president is just one, and often not the most influential, of
the agency's constituencies; OIRA review helps bolster his standing.
The authors also argue that cost-benefit analysis, as practiced by OIRA,
introduces a systematic bias toward under-regulation--quite apart from the
cost-benefit "fallacies" discussed previously-because it is used only to
determine whether the benefits of a particular regulation outweigh its costs
and is not applied, or not frequently enough applied, to determine whether
more stringent regulation would yield a still greater margin of benefits in
excess of costs.72 OIRA no doubt keeps unduly expensive regulations from
being promulgated more often than it prompts an agency to increase the
stringency of a proposed regulation; in this simple sense it reduces the burden imposed upon the economy by regulation, which by the authors' lights
makes it "antiregulation."
But to say that OIRA review causes systematic under-regulation conflates the methods used to set the agendas of the regulatory agencies-that
is, to determine ex ante what they will consider regulating and when-with
the method OIRA uses ex post to determine whether a given regulation is
worth implementing. So understood, to say that OIRA cost-benefit analysis
is a "one-way ratchet" that causes systematic under-regulation puts the
whole weight of efficient choice framing (or agenda setting) upon the
method used for making a choice once framed (p. 153). At the same time, it
shifts to OIRA a responsibility for which the regulatory agency has the
comparative advantage by reason of its specialized knowledge of the field
within its charge. Revesz and Livermore's argument is analogous to a claim
that, because a produce inspector only tosses out the bad apples and does
not simultaneously encourage additional apple growing, he is causing too
few good apples to reach the market.
The authors accordingly suggest that OIRA review be reoriented "away
from checking agencies and toward agenda-setting and the calibration of
regulatory stringency" (p. 171). They do not, however, develop the implications of such a change. It would be virtually impossible for OIRA to reach
71.

This problem of the "iron triangle" was famously discussed in THEODORE J. LOwi,
33-35, 58 (2d ed. 1979).
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72. "OIRA mostly seeks to ensure that the agency regulation is not too stringent, and does
not impose higher economic costs than are justified.... Because there is no comparable formalized
procedure geared to increasing regulatory stringency, regulations tend to be less stringent than
would be economically efficient." P. 153.
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back to the agency's agenda-setting stage and revise or create new rules. A
major rule typically has a long gestation period. One study of major rules
promulgated during the Carter and first Reagan Administrations showed that
on average about eight years-and in some cases as many as twelve yearshad elapsed between the initiation and the completion of the regulatory
process, broadly conceived to encompass the early surveys, studies, and
analyses undertaken before the agency committed itself to promulgate a
regulation." Those early steps are rarely irreversible but they generate momentum. By the time the agency is ready to issue an "Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking" the die may well have been cast. To be sure, the details of the ensuing regulation have not yet been decided, but the de facto
commitment to regulate the subject matter has been made. When a draft
proposed rule is eventually submitted to OIRA, both the program agency
and the OIRA staff may have very limited options; all the more so when the
program agency later sends the draft final rule to OIRA. 74
Although we doubt (for reasons detailed below) the agencies' current
methods for determining which regulations to consider leads to underregulation, we agree that a role for OIRA in setting agencies' regulatory
agendas likely would improve the quality of their overall work product. For
all the reasons that presidential review of final agency decisions is desirable,
enhanced presidential control over agency agenda setting should be as well.
But the best mechanism for agenda setting is a complicated question, one
the authors do not explore in any depth. Centralized review of agency
agenda setting has been tried. President Reagan established the strongest
version in Executive Order No. 12,498, 75 which required each agency to
submit a "Regulatory Program" to the director of the OMB, who could review each agency's draft program and recommend new regulatory or
deregulatory activities he thought necessary to achieve consistency with the
administration's policies and priorities. Any disagreement between the
agency and the director was to be resolved by the president if the agency
head wanted to pursue an appeal that far. President Clinton's Executive Order
No. 12,86676
system,
which
still in place changes
but is less
centralized
in thatinstituted
the OMBa similar
no longer
reviews
andisrecommends
to

73. These data, from an unpublished study done during the Reagan Administration, are not
out of line with subsequent published reports. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 19, at 415-16 (finding
that the time between inclusion of a rule in the annual Unified Agenda, which comprises regulations
the agency believes may be proposed that year, and final rulemaking averaged 932 days during the
Clinton Administration and 1,073 days during the W. Bush Administration, not including the years it
may take to study, survey, and analyze an issue before deciding to go forward with rulemaking).
74. On a related point, Shapiro suggests that during the last two administrations the procedures through which centralized regulatory review was conducted had very little to do with the
substance, stringency, or number of regulations developed, a finding at odds with Revesz and Livermore's argument that the "institutions of regulatory review" are "biased against regulation." P.
171. Shapiro shows that in spite of using similar review procedures, Presidents Clinton and Bush
presided over very different regulatory states, both in terms of the amount and the nature of the
regulations issued. See generally Shapiro, supranote 19.
75. 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985) (repealed 1993), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
76.

3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
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the agencies' published Regulatory Plans." Instead it simply circulates the
plans to any affected agencies, the CEA, and the vice president, who may
raise any concerns with the issuing agency. In practice, most agencies supplement the required annual Regulatory Plan with a more comprehensive
biannual regulatory agenda.78
Even if centralized regulatory review were biased against regulation,
that bias is justified if, as we and most observers believe, regulatory agencies are themselves biased in favor of regulation. But the authors also reject
the possibility that any bias toward under-regulation created by cost-benefit
analysis or its implementation might be a useful check upon the correlative
bias of the regulatory agencies. In their view, there is simply no reason to be
concerned that the program agencies will be systematically inclined toward
overzealous regulation. Indeed, they worry that "[i]f anything ... agencies
tend towards inertia and inaction" (p. 165). This concern betrays a serious
misunderstanding of the incentives facing the program agency.
Contemporary regulation is concerned almost exclusively with the mitigation of risks-risks to human health and the environment; risks to the
solvency of financial institutions; and risks from hazardous products, automobiles, workplace conditions, and so on. During the early years of
centralized regulatory review in the Carter and Reagan Administrations,
there was also a great deal of economic regulation of business, much of
which was harmful to consumers and socially wasteful. 79 It was economic
regulation that gave rise to the widespread call for deregulation. 0 In contrast, neither President-indeed, no sensible person-ever proposed
wholesale deregulation of risks in general or of environmental risks in particular. On the contrary, it was universally agreed both that serious
environmental risks required regulation because polluters do not otherwise
bear the costs they impose upon other users of the air and water, and that
such regulation should be accomplished in the most cost-effective manner
possible.
The authors' assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, there is good
reason to believe agencies charged with risk regulation are systematically
biased towards over-regulation because of a similar externality: risk regulators are judged by their output of rules, and punished when they fail to avert
a risk that becomes manifest, but the costs of their rules are born by regulated f-rms and the general public. Delaying approval of a drug, for example,
may impose substantial costs not only on the manufacturer, which typically
will have hundreds of millions of dollars invested in it, but also on the pub-

77. For a thorough overview, see Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of
Checks and Balances: The Case of PresidentialReview of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 17981 (1995).
78. See Reglnfo.gov, Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan, http://www.reginfo.gov/public
(last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
79.

See supra notes 8, 67 and accompanying text.

80. E.g., ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION
(1983) (proposing a series of regulatory reforms).
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lic, in the form of avoidable morbidity and mortality. 8' If so, however, it is

unlikely the agency will be criticized because those harmed ordinarily do
not know they could have been helped by a drug not yet on the market;
hence, the costs the agency will have imposed will not be attributed to the

agency's perhaps excessive caution. If, on the other hand, the agency approves a drug that turns out to have significant untoward side effects, then
the agency will be roundly criticized for its apparent imprudence. 82 Because
of this asymmetry, risk-regulating agencies-the only significant regulators
left standing-have a bias in favor of risk avoidance, regardless whether that
is the welfare maximizing outcome for the public.
One should not be surprised, therefore, if the EPA attempts to suppress
pollutants that cause respiratory ailments beyond the point where the benefits exceed the cost. If the EPA sensibly will not attempt to suppress "the last

molecule," asthmatics are understandably going to complain to their congressmen that the EPA is not doing its job, regardless whether the agency
has struck the right balance between the costs and benefits of further pollu-

tion controls. 83 On the other hand, if the EPA tightens the regulation to a
point where costs exceed benefits, there will be fewer such complaints from

asthmatics and more strenuous objections from polluters. The agency will
often prefer to be criticized by a small number of polluters (and their congressmen) than by a large number of angry individuals (and their more
numerous congressmen).
Neither are the authors correct in arguing that a disparity in interestgroup pressure will tend toward under-regulation. The authors dismiss the
notion that large numbers of aggrieved citizens can organize to exert
81.
There is extensive literature elaborating upon and attempting to estimate the cost of delay
in the drug approval process. For an overview, see Patricia M. Danzon, The PharmaceuticalIndustry, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1055, 1058-61 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
De Geest eds., 2000), availableat http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5880book.pdf.
82. The favorable press that the FDA and Dr. Frances 0. Kelsey received for the decision to
delay approval of Thalidomide is one prominent example of the attention paid to the side effects of
approved drugs as opposed to the costs imposed upon others by the unavailability of delayed drugs.
Thalidomide had been approved as a treatment for morning sickness during pregnancy in many
countries throughout Europe but was later determined to cause severe birth defects. For example, in
West Germany in 1962 alone between 3500 and 5000 babies were born with phocomelia, a deformity caused by Thalidomide. Ashley Ochs, Comment, A Study in Futility: Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Experimental Drugs Will Not Expand Access to Experimental Drugsfor the Terminally Ill,
39 SETON HALL L. REv. 559, 565 (2009). Dr. Kelsey, the FDA reviewer assigned to the drug, delayed its approval in the United States, thereby averting a certain tragedy, for which she was
awarded the Presidential Award of Distinguished Federal Civilian Service by President John F.
Kennedy. The episode made national headlines, and the story remains a "powerful [I memory"
influencing the American public's demand for safe drugs decades later. Elizabeth M. Rutherford,
The FDA and "Privatization"-The Drug Approval Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 203, 212
(1995). We are aware of no decision to expedite review of a life-saving drug receiving the same
laudatory treatment.
83. They are also going to take the agency to court, of course. E.g., Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA,
134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, Nos. 04-1275, 07-1021, 04-1378, 051409, 2008 WL 3198886 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2008) (unpublished order); Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA,
Nos. 96-1251, 96-1252 96-1255, 1996 WL 734086 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 1996) (unpublished opinion); Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, No. 93-1305, 1994 WL 329342 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 1994)
(unpublished disposition).
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pressure on regulatory agencies, whether directly or through their congressmen, to the same degree that the smaller number of polluters can do
(pp. 163-64). By the authors' account there is no reason to believe that
"special interest groups-such as environmental organizations and consumer protection groups-will have greater power in the administrative
process than industry groups" (p. 163). They state:
[C]ollective-action theory predicts just the opposite: Environmental and
consumer groups will have the most difficulty organizing themselves into
effective lobbying blocks. Industry, with fewer players and more at stake
for each firm, will have the advantage. That prediction is vindicated in our
actual process in which environmental and consumer groups are dwarfed
by industry trade associations, individual corporate lobbying, and the general probusiness and antitax lobbies. (pp. 163-64)

The authors cite no authority, empirical or otherwise, for their proposition about "our actual process," and with good reason. They reach their
conclusion by sleight of hand, obscuring the inconvenient fact that environmentalists and consumers-greater difficulty notwithstanding-have
managed to organize themselves into highly effective lobbying groups. One
way or another, mainstream environmental organizations with millions of
members have emerged in the last several decades and have succeeded in
exerting substantial influence upon the legislative process.8 Indeed, had they
not done so, there is no way Congress would have passed many of our most
protective environmental statutes. The key fact is that mainstream environmental organizations represent large numbers of people and those people
vote. Trade associations representing "fewer players [with] more at stake for
each firm," contrary to the authors, do not "have the advantage" (p. 164).
Not only do they deliver fewer votes but their second-best substitute, political contributions, have been substantially limited by campaign finance
legislation. In any dispute between environmental groups and oil refiners,
forest product companies, or the like-whether in the Congress or before its
agents such as the EPA--observation of "our actual process"
8 5 teaches that
both sides will be well represented and frequently influential.
We do not contend that the regulatory agencies are dominated by riskaverse bureaucrats, fire-breathing zealots, and political appointees intent on
mollifying staff and stakeholders at the expense of the president's policies.
But we think it is naive not to recognize that the American administrative
state has become a vast and complex enterprise, incorporating the shortcomings as well as advantages of specialization, and profuse with conflicting
purposes and opportunities for the pursuit of individual and group self84. For example, the Sierra Club has 1.3 million members, the Natural Resources Defense
Council has 1.2 million members, and the Defenders of Wildlife has 576,000 members. Defenders
of Wildlife, About Us, http://www.defenders.org/about-us (last visited Nov. 15, 2009); Natural
Resources Defense Council, About NRDC: Who We Are, http://nrdc.org/about/who-we-are.asp
(last visited Nov. 15, 2009); Sierra Club Homepage, http://www.sierraclub.org/welcome (last visited
Nov. 15, 2009).
85. Moreover, business firms may lobby for regulations in order to gain competitive advantages. See supra note 22.

April 2010]

Rationalism in Regulation

interest-in sum, a reflection of the political system that created it.s6 In this
environment, no politician who has mastered the system sufficiently to have
gained the White House is going to be content to act as a neutral optimizer
and coordinator of the regulations of dozens of agencies administering hundreds of statutes. Central oversight of agency rulemaking is but a modem
extension of central oversight of agency budgets, inaugurated in the 1920s,
and modem presidents are going to pursue the policy goals that got them
elected through regulation as well as through budgeting. We are not surprised, therefore, by the first-hand report of Elena Kagan that President
Clinton was even more assertive in putting his personal stamp on regulatory
policy than President Reagan had been.87 Readers of Retaking Rationality
will have no doubt that a President Revesz and a Vice President Livermore
would overcome their qualms about White House vulnerabilities and the
"shaky foundation" of regulatory review and be more assertive still. They
would combine cool rationality with hot rhetoric and use a capacious form
of cost-benefit analysis to pursue an aggressively "proregulation" agenda.
CONCLUSION

In the end, Revesz and Livermore have combined two different books in
crafting Retaking Rationality. One is a spirited political polemic directed to
environmental and other proregulation activists, aiming to persuade them
that they can advance their causes by joining rather than spuming the costbenefit debates. The other is an intelligent if uneven survey of the difficult
questions in cost-benefit analysis. By combining the two, however, Revesz
and Livermore have created an amalgam that is less than the sum of its
parts.
In their discussion of cost-benefit analysis, the authors time and time
again put forward a thorough analysis of some tough academic issue, only to
revert to political polemic and leave the reader wondering why there is a
debate if the answers are so easy. The fact is that the answers are not as easy
as Revesz and Livermore make them out to be, down to the last "fallacy."
By the time they turn to "Rethinking OIRA" and the purpose of centralized regulatory review, Revesz and Livermore have all but abandoned their
scholarly mantle in favor of personal policy prescriptions. Their case against
86. An excellent, nuanced analysis of administrative politics is the "Political Oversight"
chapter of MATIHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 101-23 (2006).
87. According to then-professor Elena Kagan, who had served in a senior policy post in the
Clinton White House:
In light of this criticism [of the rulemaking interventions of Presidents Reagan and Bush], observers might have predicted that when a Democratic President assumed office in 1993, a
radical curtailment of presidential supervision of administrative action would follow. Instead,
the very opposite occurred....
President Clinton treated the sphere of regulation as his own ... in a way no other modem
President had done.
Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration,114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2281 (2001).
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OIRA is essentially that it enables the president, through the device of costbenefit analysis, to exert an antiregulatory influence upon the rulemaking
output of his administration. Instead, they would recast OIRA not as a servant of the president but as a machine to calibrate the optimal stringency of
each regulation and "prioritize the non-cost-benefit analysis function of
OIRA, including interagency coordination and harmonization." (p. 171). We
remain doubtful that should or will happen for the reason we gave more than
20 years ago: "[E]very president has a program, and no program can be implemented in the modem regulatory state without regulatory planning and
regulatory review by the Executive Office of the President.""
Most recently Cass R. Sunstein, President Obama's OIRA administrator,
made the point this way in his Senate confirmation hearings:
The foundation of regulatory review-the first question to be asked by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is what are Congress's instructions? That is the starting point for any mechanism for regulatory
review.
The second task is to ensure that within the boundaries set by Congress,
things done are consistent with the President's own priorities and principles. The third task is to kind of institutionalize the notion of looking
before you leap so that when the government is starting with a regulation,
whether it involves homeland security, education, energy, or anything else,
there's some sense of what the consequences are likely to be. That promotes accountability. It helps ensure that citizens and
government can
89
know what the likely effects of government action are.
Thus centralized regulatory review aims to ensure that regulations are
consistent with law and, to the extent permitted by law, consistent with the
policies of the president. White House review and cost-benefit analysis can
inform, but they cannot displace, the political judgments essential to regulatory policymaking.

88.

DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1088.
89. Nomination of Cass R. Sunstein to be Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget: Hearing of the S. Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Comm., 111th Cong., at *6 (2009) (Statement of Cass R. Sunstein)
(LEXIS, Federal News Service File).

